Related to [Benjamin-Loison/termux-app/issues/36#issuecomment-2322872930](https://github.com/Benjamin-Loison/termux-app/issues/36#issuecomment-2322872930).
Not sudo programs can't access other programs memory right?
Can any selected program get clipboard content/keyboard strokes (even background ones)? If so, then Benjamin-Loison/keepassxc/issues/6 looks important.
Not `sudo` programs can't access other programs memory right?
Can any selected program get clipboard content/keyboard strokes (even background ones)? If so, then [Benjamin-Loison/keepassxc/issues/6](https://github.com/Benjamin-Loison/keepassxc/issues/6) looks important.
Related to [Benjamin_Loison/Thunderbird/issues/89#issuecomment-2447527](https://codeberg.org/Benjamin_Loison/Thunderbird/issues/89#issuecomment-2447527).
Related to [Benjamin_Loison/shred/issues/](https://codeberg.org/Benjamin_Loison/shred/issues){[18](https://codeberg.org/Benjamin_Loison/shred/issues/18),[17](https://codeberg.org/Benjamin_Loison/shred/issues/17)}.
Concerning Docker, see for instance [Benjamin_Loison/etesync-dav/issues/4#issuecomment-7661008](https://codeberg.org/Benjamin_Loison/etesync-dav/issues/4#issuecomment-7661008).
...
DESCRIPTION
bwrap is a unprivileged low-level sandboxing tool (optionally setuid on older distributions). You are unlikely to use it directly from the commandline, although that is possible.
It works by creating a new, completely empty, filesystem namespace where the root is on a tmpfs that is invisible from the host, and which will be automatically cleaned up when the last process exits.
You can then use commandline options to construct the root filesystem and process environment for the command to run in the namespace.
By default, bwrap creates a new mount namespace for the sandbox. Optionally it also sets up new user, ipc, pid, network and uts namespaces (but note the user namespace is required if bwrap is not
installed setuid root). The application in the sandbox can be made to run with a different UID and GID.
If needed (e.g. when using a PID namespace) bwrap is running a minimal pid 1 process in the sandbox that is responsible for reaping zombies. It also detects when the initial application process (pid 2)
dies and reports its exit status back to the original spawner. The pid 1 process exits to clean up the sandbox when there are no other processes in the sandbox left.
...
In the context of [Benjamin_Loison/Debian/issues/21#issuecomment-8186555](https://codeberg.org/Benjamin_Loison/Debian/issues/21#issuecomment-8186555) after having killed Prism Launcher with `pkill -f`.
```
ps aux | grep -i [b]wrap
```
<details>
<summary>Output:</summary>
```
benjami+ 3136507 0.0 0.0 3576 1852 ? S Nov08 0:00 bwrap --args 45 -- prismlauncher
benjami+ 3136515 0.0 0.0 3576 1840 ? S Nov08 0:00 bwrap --args 45 -- xdg-dbus-proxy --args=47
benjami+ 3136519 0.0 0.0 3584 1268 ? S Nov08 0:00 bwrap --args 45 -- prismlauncher
```
</details>
```bash
man bwrap
```
<details>
<summary>Output:</summary>
```
...
DESCRIPTION
bwrap is a unprivileged low-level sandboxing tool (optionally setuid on older distributions). You are unlikely to use it directly from the commandline, although that is possible.
It works by creating a new, completely empty, filesystem namespace where the root is on a tmpfs that is invisible from the host, and which will be automatically cleaned up when the last process exits.
You can then use commandline options to construct the root filesystem and process environment for the command to run in the namespace.
By default, bwrap creates a new mount namespace for the sandbox. Optionally it also sets up new user, ipc, pid, network and uts namespaces (but note the user namespace is required if bwrap is not
installed setuid root). The application in the sandbox can be made to run with a different UID and GID.
If needed (e.g. when using a PID namespace) bwrap is running a minimal pid 1 process in the sandbox that is responsible for reaping zombies. It also detects when the initial application process (pid 2)
dies and reports its exit status back to the original spawner. The pid 1 process exits to clean up the sandbox when there are no other processes in the sandbox left.
...
```
</details>
Maybe related to [containers/bubblewrap](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap), source: [GNOME/nautilus/blob/b6b0b45c3e089e04dd65380f89bd7a27bbbe22af/README.md?plain=1#L12](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/nautilus/-/blob/b6b0b45c3e089e04dd65380f89bd7a27bbbe22af/README.md?plain=1#L12).
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
Like disk and network access. Maybe like snap and flatpak.
+20
Related to Benjamin-Loison/keepassxc/issues/59.
https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/fwux29/signal_desktop_stores_the_encryption_key_in_a/
Related to Benjamin-Loison/termux-app/issues/36#issuecomment-2322872930.
Related to Benjamin-Loison/android/issues/46.
Not
sudoprograms can't access other programs memory right?Can any selected program get clipboard content/keyboard strokes (even background ones)? If so, then Benjamin-Loison/keepassxc/issues/6 looks important.
Related to Benjamin_Loison/Thunderbird/issues/89#issuecomment-2447527.
Related to Benjamin_Loison/gpg/issues/26.
Wikipedia: Qubes OS
Related to Benjamin_Loison/openssh/issues/43.
Wikipedia: Access control list may help.
See on my Linux Mint 22 Cinnamon Framework 13
benjamin-less-safeuser.Related to Benjamin_Loison/shred/issues/{18,17}.
Note that I am fine having to specify which file(s) or/and folder(s) I give access to a program, possibly even if need a reboot.
The person:
limited file system access of Firefox to downloads for instance if I remember correctly.
Vagrant may help, see Benjamin_Loison/fennecbuild/issues/8.
Related to Benjamin-Loison/shotcut/issues/5.
Related to Benjamin-Loison/selenium/issues/22.
Related to Benjamin-Loison/nemo/issues/27.
Related to Benjamin-Loison/android/issues/222.
Should read Wikipedia: Security-Enhanced Linux (1298109462).
https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop/#security-focused-distributions
https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop/#whonix
apparmor.d
https://whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher
Concerning Docker, see for instance Benjamin_Loison/etesync-dav/issues/4#issuecomment-7661008.
In the context of Benjamin_Loison/Debian/issues/21#issuecomment-8186555 after having killed Prism Launcher with
pkill -f.Output:
Output:
Maybe related to containers/bubblewrap, source: GNOME/nautilus/blob/b6b0b45c3e089e04dd65380f89bd7a27bbbe22af/README.md?plain=1#L12.
Related to Benjamin_Loison/gnome-control-center/issues/57.
Related to Benjamin_Loison/Debian/issues/215.
ProtonMail/proton-bridge/blob/c32c431640026b25609b1926a3d6380c7f4f15da/README.md#launcher
Related to Benjamin_Loison/openssh/-/issues/93.